Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment by Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto
Income Distribution, Political Instability
and Investment
by
Alberto Alesina, Harvard University
Roberto Perotti, Columbia University
October 1994
released October 1995
1994-95 Discussion Paper Series No. 751
Income distribution, political instability,
and investment.
Alberto Alesina Roberto Perotti
Harvard University, Columbia University
NBER and CEPR
First version: September 1992
Revised: October 1994
Alberto Alesina gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Institute for Policy
Research. We thank two anonymous referees, Edgar Ariza-Nino, Gilbert Metcalf, Fabio
Schiantarelli, Joseph Stiglitz and participants in seminars at Berkeley, Harvard, IGIER,
NBER and at the 1993 AEA meetings for useful comments. Robert Barro and Marianne
Fay kindly made available recently assembled data. Some of the work was completed while
we were visiting IGIER in Milan. We thank this institution for its hospitality.
Income distribution, political instability, and investment.
Abstract
This paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960-85 the fol-
lowing hypotheses. Income inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political
i
instability. The latter, by creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, re-
duces investment. As a consequence, income inequality and investment are inversely re-
lated. Since investment is a primary engine of. growth, this paper identifies a channel for
an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth.
We measure socio-political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more
or less violent phenomena of political unrest and we test our hypotheses by estimating a
two-equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and aiji index of
socio-political instability j
Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the specification of the ijnodel and
the measure of political instability, and are unchanged when the model is estimated using
i
robust regression techniques.
Alberto Alesina Roberto Perotti
Harvard University, Columbia University!
NBER and CEPR
1 Introduction.
This paper studies the effects of income distribution on investment, by focusing on political
instability as the channel which links these two variables. Income inequality increases social
discontent and fuels social unrest. The latter, by increasing the probability of coups, revo-
lutions, mass violence or, more generally, by increasing policy uncertainty and threatening
property rights, has a negative effect on investment and, as a consequence, reduces growth.
Several authors have recently argued that income inequality is harmful for growth:
in more unequal societies, the demand for fiscal redistribution financed by distbrtionary
i
taxation is higher, causing a lower rate of growth.1 Alesina and Rodrik (1993, J994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1991) present reduced form regressions supportive of this hypothesis.
An important question, still unresolved empirically, is what exactly is th£ channel
through which inequality harms investment and growth. Perotti (1994) explicitly inves-
tigates the fiscal channel described above, with, however, rather inconclusive results.
In this paper we emphasize and test a different link from income inequality to capi-
tal accumulation: political instability. Therefore, our paper is related to the research on
the effects of political instability on growth. In particular, Barro (1991), Alesiiia, Ozler,
Roubini and Swagel (1992), Block-Bomberg (1992) and Mauro (1993) find an inverse rela-
tionship between political instability and growth or investment, using different techniques,
approaches and data2 . Venieris and Gupta (1986) identify an inverse relationship between
political instability and the savings rate. !
We estimate on a cross-section of 71 countries for the period 1960-85 a two|-equation
system in which the endogenous variables are investment in physical capital and a, measure
of political instability. 3 In our model, economic and political variables are jointly en-
dogenous, an issue that has been generally ignored in the recent literature on th$ political
economy of growth.4 We are specifically interested in two questions: »
(i) Does income inequality increase political instability? ;
(ii) Does political instability reduce investment?
According to our findings, the answer to both questions is "yes". First, more unequal
1A non-exhaustive list of papers in this area includes Alesina and Rodrik (1993, 1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1991), Bertola (1991) and Perotti (1993).
2Londegran and Poole (1990, 1991) in related work do not seem to find such evidence. For a discussion
of their'results and comparisons with other literature see Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992).
3The number of countries used in different specifications and different tests may vary slightly because
of data availability. We have always chosen the largest sample of countries for which data were available.
Exceptions are Londegran and Poole (1990), (1991), Alesina et al. (1992) and Block-Bomberg (1992).
societies are more politically unstable: in particular, our results suggest that political
stability is enhanced by the presence of a wealthy middle class. Second, political instability
has an adverse effect on investment and, therefore, on growth. Furthermore, these two
effects (from inequality to instability, and from instability to investment) are not only
statistically significant, but also economically significant.
We also test whether income distribution influences investment directly, in addition to
the channel via politically instability. Several arguments would imply such a direct link.
The first is a "Kaldorian" view (Kaldor (1956)) which holds that more inequality favors
more accumulation, because the rich save more than the poor. As mentioned above, a
second view is based on the effects of inequality on the demand for fiscal redistribution: this
argument would imply an inverse relation between inequality and investment in physical
capital (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1991)). These
two effects go in opposite directions and, in principle, they may cancel out. In fact, in our
sample income distribution has little additional effect on investment after controlling for
political instability.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses problems of definition and mea-
surement of political instability, and presents our index. Section 3 describes our data.
Section 4 describes the specification of our two-equation system and discusses various iden-
tification issues. In section 5 we present our main results. Section 6 discusses several
tests of sensitivity of our specification and the robustness of our results. The last section
concludes.
2 Definition and measure of political instability.
Social and political instability are variables that are hard to define and measure in a way
which can be used for econometric work. Political instability can be viewed in two ways.
The first one emphasizes executive instability. The second one is based upon indicators of
social unrest and political violence.
The first approach defines political instability as the "propensity to observe government
changes". These changes can be "constitutional", i.e. take place within the law, or "un-
constitutional", i.e. they can be coups d'etat. The basic idea is that a high propensity to
executive changes is associated with policy uncertainty and, in some cases, with threats to
property rights. Note that the "propensity" to executive changes is distinct from the actual
frequency of changes, and can be measured by probit regressions in which the probability
of a change in the executive is related to several economic, socio-political and institutional
variables.
For example Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Edwards and Tabellini
(1991) adopt this definition of instability in their work on inflation. One important issue,
however, which these authors do not completely address is that of "joint endogeneity". On
one hand, political instability affects aggregate economic outcome. On the other hand,
the latter influences executive instability. Londegran and Poole (1990), (1991), Alesina
et al. (1992) and Block-Bomberg (1992) have explicitly taken into account this problem
in their work on executive instability and economic growth. All these authors estimate
two-equations systems: one equation is a probit regression, which estimates the propensity
to government changes, while the other is a regression for economic growth.
The second approach to measuring political instability does not focus directly on ex-
ecutive changes. Socio-political instability is measured by constructing an index which
summarizes various variables capturing phenomena of social unrest. An important ref-
erence on this point is Hibbs (1973), who uses the method of principal components to
construct such index. More recently, Venieris and Gupta (1986), (1989), Gupta (1990),
Barro (1991), Ozler and Tabellini (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1992) and Mauro (1993)
have used several indices of socio-political instability as an explanatory variable in various
regressions in which the dependent variable is growth, savings or investment. As empha-
sized above, joint endogeneity issues are crucial: in many cases there are good reasons to
believe that the left hand side variable that one is attempting to explain as a function of
socio-political instability (such as inflation, growth, investment etc.) is itself a determinant
of social unrest5 .
Which of the two approaches to measuring political instability described above is prefer-
able is not clear a priori and may depend upon the specific issue under consideration. For
instance, one may argue that, for a given level of expected government turnover, phenom-
ena of social unrest do not have any direct impact on policy uncertainty, and therefore on
economic decisions. This might be a strong but useful "identifying" assumption: policy
changes relevant for economic decisions can occur only when governments change. On the
other hand, one may argue that, particularly when it reaches very high levels, social un-
rest disrupts market activities and might affect investment for reasons different than the
uncertainty associated with high expected government turnover. In fact, mass violence,
civil wars, political disorder and physical threats to workers and entrepreneurs engaged
5Hibbs (1973) and Gupta (1990) do take this problem into account in their work.
in productive activities can have direct effects on productivity and therefore on the rate
of return to investment. In addition, high levels of social and political unrest - including
a high frequency of coups and of episodes of violence on politicians - might drastically
shorten the horizon of politicians. With a short expected tenure in office, the reputation
mechanisms that ordinarily prevent the taxation of fixed factors, and capital in particular,
are less likely to be operative. The higher expected taxation of capital therefore might
discourage investment directly, over and above the uncertainty effect noted before.6
This paper adopts the second approach to measuring political instability. We explicitly
take into account problems of joint endogeneity by estimating a system of two equations
in which.the two endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio- political
instability, SPI. The index is constructed by applying the method of principal component
to the following variables: ASS ASS, the number of politically motivated assassinations;
DEATH, the number of people killed in conjunction with phenomena of domestic mass
violence, as a fraction of the total population; SCOUP, the number of successful coups;
UCOUP, the number of attempted but unsuccessful coups; DEM, a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 in democracies, .5 in "semi-democracies" and 0 in dictatorships. A
"democracy" is defined as a country with free competitive elections; a semi-democracy is
a country with some form of elections but with severe restrictions on political rights (for
instance, Mexico); a dictatorship is a country without competitive elections7 . All the
variables are expressed as the average of annual values over the sample period, 1960-85. A
more detailed definition of the variables used in this paper, including sources, is in Table
1.
In choosing these variables to include in the index, we want to capture the idea of po-
litical instability viewed as a threat to property rights. Therefore we include two variables
(ASSASS and DEATH) which capture phenomena of mass violence as well as violent and
illegal forms of political expressions. The problem arises whether these variables should
be measured in per capita terms. Conceptually, it is not clear which measure is more
appropriate. However, one can reasonably argue that a relatively rare event such as the
assassination of a prominent politician - like a prime minister - is just as disruptive of the
social and political climate of a small country as of a large country. Thus, this variable
should be measured in absolute, not per capita, terms. Conversely, the significance of a
6Note that this effects of social unrest on the expected level of taxation might be less strong in the
case of legal executive turnover emphasized in the first notion of instability, because in this latter case a
policymaker ousted from power can still regain power with positive probability.
7This variable is obtained from Alesina et al. (1992)
given number of deaths in a domestic disturbance or a civil war clearly depends on the size
of the population. Thus, the number of deaths should be measured in per capita, not in
absolute, terms. This is the approach we take in constructing our index: throughout the
paper, ASS ASS is measured in absolute terms while DEATH is the number of deaths per
million population. However, we also experimented with all the alternative combinations
of definitions of these two variables, and the results did not change appreciably. Thus,
our index does not appear to be unduly sensitive to the way we measure the variables
ASS ASS and DEATH. Our index also includes two variables (SCOUP and UCOUP)
which capture illegal and typically violent transfers of executive power, successful or at-
tempted. .The variable DEM is included in the SPI index mainly because of reporting
problems: in most dictatorships the government controls the press and restricts the diffu-
sion of information, particularly abroad. Thus, measures of socio-political unrest are likely
to be under-reported, for propaganda reasons, in dictatorships.
The inclusion of DEM in our SPI index is also advisable for a second conceptual
reason. Dictatorships are much more prone to be overthrown by extremists than stable
democracies. That is, for the same level of observed political violence, the likelihood
of a violent overthrown of the government with a breakdown of legality is higher in a
dictatorship.
Applying the method of principal components8 to the five variables listed above leads
to the following index of socio-political instability:
SPI = 1.39 ASS ASS + 1.21 DEATH + 7.58 SCOUP + 7.23 UCOUP - 5.45 DEM (1)
Note that, in constructing our inde, we first standardized all variables appearing in
it; therefore, the orders of magnitude of the effects of each variable are comparable. Our
8The method of principal components is used to describe a set of variables with a set of variables of lower
dimensionality. This method locates n linear combinations ("principal components") of the n columns of
the X'X matrix, all orthogonal to each other, with the following property: the first principal component
Pi minimizes tr(X — p\a'i)'(X — pia[), where a\ is the eigenvector of the X'X matrix associated with the
largest eigenvalue. Intuitively, p\ summarizes the n variables in X by giving the best linear description of
the columns of X in a least squares sense. The second principal component p2 also describes what is not
"captured" by the first component p\ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals after subtracting pi, i.e.
P2 minimizes tr(X — p\a'x — p2a'2y(X — pia'j — P2<*2)> w n e r e a2 is n o w the eigenvector associated with the
second largest eigenvalue, and so on. We use the first principal component of the five variables listed in the
text as our SPI index. One can measure the contribution of the first principal component to explaining the
total variability of the original variables, which is captured by the expression trX'X. It can be shown that
the contribution of the first principal component to the reduction of this variability is trX'X — Ai, where
Ai is the highest eigenvalue. Because we standardize all our variables, the variance explained by the first
principal component is generally quite low, between .3 and .4. If we had not standardized our variables,
the first principal component would have been practically identical to the variable with the highest order
of magnitude, in our case DEATH. See Theil (1971), Chapter 1, for a brief description of the method of
principal components.
SPI index is related, but far from identical, to indices recently proposed by Venieris and
Gupta (1986) and Gupta (1990), which we used in previous versions of this paper, and
is somewhat different from Hibbs' (1973) index. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our
results to the use of these alternative indices and to small changes in the specification of
our index.
3 Data and sample period.
We perform cross sectional regressions using a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960-
1985. The binding constraint on the number of countries is the data availability. We
have income distribution data for 74 countries, but for only 71 of these we have data on
political instability and the other variables we use in our regressions, like investment shares
in 1960-85 and GDP per capita in 1960.
We use the same dataset on income distribution assembled by Perotti (1994). The in-
come distribution data consist of the income shares of the five quintiles of the population,
measured as close as possible to the beginning of each sample period, 1960. In our frame-
work, income distribution is predetermined; therefore, it is appropriate to measure this
variable at the beginning of the sample period. In fact, in the long run income distribution
is likely to be endogenous, as it is arguably affected by such factors as land reforms, the
savings behavior of the population etc. These problems of endogeneity are clearly hard to
overcome: however, measuring income distribution at the beginning of the sample period
is a way of minimizing them.
Data on quintiles shares in existing datasets on income distribution derive from surveys
conducted at different times, and differ in terms of their coverage (nationwide, urban,
etc.), of the definition of income (pre-tax, pre-transfers, etc.), and of the definition of
recipient unit (by households, by economically active persons, by individuals, etc.). In
principle, all data refer to pre-tax income, while transfers are generally (but not always)
included in data organized by households but not in data by economically active persons or
individulas. However, in the surveys the actual definition of income used by the respondent
is very difficult to control, particularly in developing countries. Since income distribution
data generally come from expenditure surveys, it is likely that in most cases transfers are
included in the responses used to construct the income shares.
The majority of countries in our sample have data by households with nationwide cov-
erage. For the remaining countries, observations organized by economically active persons
and by individuals have to be used. However, there are good reasons to believe that these
two types of data systematically understate the share of incomes of the third and fourth
quintiles of the distribution, relative to data organized by households. In order to make
data by economically active persons comparable to those by households, Perotti (1994)
uses the following procedure. For some countries, data are available on both the distri-
bution by households and by economically active persons in the same year and with the
same coverage. Using these countries, one can estimate by what factor, on average, the
shares of the third and fourth quintiles in the distributions by economically active persons
underestimate those by households. Multiplying the observations by economically active
persons by this factor, one can make them comparable to the observations by households.
One can therefore use the former type of data when the latter is not available. A similar
procedure can be followed for data organized by individuals and for data with less than
nationwide coverage - note, however, that only 6 countries out of 71 in our sample have less
than nationwide coverage. Thus, following this procedure, one can construct a dataset in
which other types of income distribution data can be made more consistent with data by
households and with nationwide coverage.9 As mentioned above, no ready adjustment is
possible for discrepancies in the definition of the income concept among surveys, whether
it is pre- or post- tax or transfers.
The binding constraint on the initial date of the sample period is the availability of
economic data. Our main sources for this variable is the Barro-Wolf and the Barro-Lee
datasets, with the exceptions noted in Table 1. The end of our sample period (1985) is
imposed by the availability of economic and socio-political variables. The list of these
variables with their sources is included in Table 1, as well.
Table 2 reports the average of our SPI index for the sample 1960-85, ordered from
the poorest to the richest country, in terms of their per capita income in 1960. This
ordering immediately highlights a positive correlation between poverty and socio-political
instability. Furthermore, a few countries suggest interesting observations. Japan has a
much lower index of instability than countries at comparable level of development in 1960.
Thirty years later this country is one of the richest in the world. The opposite observation
holds for Argentina: it has the second highest SPI index and from 1960 to 1985 it has
dropped several steps in the income ladder. Not surprisingly, the most stable countries
are OECD democracies, even though several LDC's, such as Botswana, are also relatively
9Note, however, that our results would not change if data by economically active persons, by individuals
and with less than nationwide coverage were not adjusted as described above.
stable. The case of Venezuela is also interesting: in 1960 it had the fifth highest per capita
income in the sample, but a much higher SPI index than the countries in the same group.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for our variables and Table 4 highlights simple
correlations between them. The two key correlations for our purposes are those between
SPI and investment, INV', and between SPI and MIDCLASS, which represents the
share of total income of the third and fourth quintiles of the population.
The two correlations are -.42 and -.47, respectively. These signs are consistent with
our hypothesis, namely that socio-political instability depresses investment and income
inequality makes the socio-political environment more unstable. Also, SPI is negatively
correlated with both the level of income and the level of education. However, the latter two
variables are highly correlated with each other. Note that MI DC LASS has a much higher
correlation with secondary school enrollment than with primary school enrollment. This
correlation suggests, perhaps, that if the middle class is sufficiently well off, they can obtain
for their children a level of education beyond the primary one. Because of this correlation,
and because our sample includes several LDC's in which enrollment ratios in secondary
schools in 1960 were extremely small, we prefer to use primary school enrollment as our
measure of education. Finally, in our sample MIDCLASS has a correlation of -.93 with
the share of the richest quintile (not shown). This implies that an increase in the share
of the middle class is associated, on average, with essentially a one for one decrease in the
share of the richest quintile. This is the main reason why the two variables do not appear
at the same time in our regressions.
Also, Table 4 reports the correlations of our index with its components. Using these
correlations with the coefficients of the SPI index displayed in eq. (1), one can form an
idea of the importance of each component in our results. We discuss this topic extensively
in section 6.
4 Model specification.
Our hypothesis is that income inequality increases socio-political instability and the latter
reduces the propensity to invest. A large group of impoverished citizens, facing a small
and very rich group of well-off individuals is likely to become dissatisfied with the existing
socio-economic status quo and demand radical changes, so that mass violence and illegal
seizure of power are more likely than when income distribution is more equitable. Several
arguments justify the second link, from political instability to investment. Broadly speak-
ing, political instability affects investment through three main channels. First, because it
increases the expected level of taxation of factors that can be accumulated, through the
mechanism noted in section 2. Second, because phenomena of social unrest can cause dis-
ruption of productive activities, and therefore a fall in the productivity of labor and capital.
Third, because socio-political instability increases uncertainty, thereby inducing investors
to postpone projects, invest abroad (capital flights) or simply consume more. In turn, a
high value of the SPI index implies high uncertainty for two reasons. First, when social
unrest is widespread, the probability of the government being overthrown is higher, making
the course of future economic policy and even protection of property rights more uncertain.
Second, the occurrence of attempted or successful coups indicates a propensity to abandon
the rule of law and therefore, in principle, a threat to established property rights.
We capture these two links in a simple bivariate simultaneous equation model with SPI
and investment as endogenous variables. The most basic specification of this model is as
follows:
INV = a0 + OLXSPI + a2GDP + azPPPIDE + +aAPPPI + Cl (2)
SPI = p0 + ft PRIM + (33INV + /34MIDCLASS + e2 (3)
In specifying this system, we encounter a problem common to all the recent empirical
growth literature: very few variables on the r.h.s. can be regarded as truly exogenous over
our sample period. Our strategy in testing our theory has two steps. First, we choose
the the basic specification of equations (2) and (3) following standard specifications in the
recent empirical growth literature, keeping in mind the need to identify the system through
reasonable exclusion restrictions. In fact, note that our specification leads to a reduced form
that is very similar to the investment equation in Barro (1991): the three critical points
of departure from that regressions are that we measure political instability differently,
endogenize the SPI index and introduce an income distribution variable. Second, because
we recognize that our basic specification is only one among several reasonable alternatives,
in section 6 we subject it to an extensive sensitivity and robustness analysis, by adding
exogenous variables, changing our exclusion restrictions, etc.
As discussed above, we expect a\ in the investment equation to be negative. In the same
equation, we control for the inital level of GDP per capita, as it is common in the literature.
Note that the sign of the coefficient of GDP, a.2-, is a priori ambiguous: according to the
exogenous growth theory, long-run convergence would imply a negative sign. However, as
Levine and Renelt (1992) have shown, empirically GDP enters with a consistently positive
sign in cross-country investment regressions, suggesting that the convergence in GDP per
9
capita occurs through channels different from increases in physical investment. The two
variables PPPI (the PPP value of the investment deflator in 1960 relative to that of
the U.S.) and PPPIDE (the magnitude of the deviation of PPPI from the sample mean)
capture the effects of domestic distortions which obviously would affect investment directly.
Turning to the SPI equation, we included the variable PRIM (the enrollment ratio in
primary school in 1960) as a proxy for human capital, on the ground that a higher level
of education may reduce political violence and channel political action within institutional
rules (see Huntington (1968) or Hibbs (1973)).10 Therefore, we expect /?x to be negative.
Investment is also included to test whether rapidly growing economies tend to be more
stable: on the one hand, more growth means more prosperity, less dissatisfaction and
possibly more stability, implying a negative sign for /?2. On the other hand, periods of
very high growth may temporarily lead to social disruptions and economic transformation
which may actually increase political instability. Finally, as discussed at length above, we
expect a positive relation between inequality and instability: accordingly, under the null
hypothesis the sign of /?3 should be negative when an index of equality is used.
There are three crucial identifying assumptions in our system. First, we exclude
PPPIDE and PPPI from the SPI equation. We feel these are reasonable restrictions:
these variables measure market distortions and the relative price of investment goods, both
of which should have a direct effect on investment decisions and a much less clear-cut effect
on social unrest. Second, we exclude PRIM from the investment equation. This restriction
is certainly less natural than the previous one; therefore, later we present regressions with
our proxy for human capital included in the investment equation, and show that the results
are virtually unaffected. Third, initial GDP per capita is excluded form the SPI equa-
tion. This restriction too could be subject to criticism: thus, in this case too we present
regressions showing that the inclusion of this variable does not alter our results. Sensitivity
analysis on these and other identifying assumptions are presented below in Section 6: our
basic results are quite robust to changes in the specification of the system11 .
10In addition to providing new measures of primary enrollment, Barro and Lee (1993) have recently
estimated several stock measures of human capital, and they kindly made all their data available to us. We
prefer to use their primary enrollment ratio which is not an estimate but a direct observation. When we use
their estimated human capital stock our regressions are less successful, possibly because of measurement
errors in the constructed stock variables.
nOur paper is somewhat related to recent work by Gupta (1990). Like us, Gupta estimates a struc-
tural model where income distribution affects political instability and the latter affects investment. Our
specification, however, builds on the recent empirical literature on growth and differs substantially from
Gupta's. Moreover, he has observations on income distribution for only 49 of the 104 countries in his
sample. The remaining observations are obtained by regressing the existing sample of income distribu-
tion variables on a set of explanatory variables, and using the estimated coefficients to generate values
for the missing observations. There is no need to underline the problems of this procedure. Finally, for
10
We have also built upon this basic specification by adding other exogenous variables.
We added in the SPI equation a variable that captures the degree of linguistic and ethnic
fragmentation, on the ground that more homogeneous societies are likely to exhibit, ceteris
paribus, less socio-political instability. We also included a variable for urbanization in
the SPI equation: several political scientists (for instance, Huntington (1968) and Hibbs
(1973)) have argued that more urbanized societies should be more politically unstable
because political participation and social unrest are more likely to be higher in cities.
Finally, one could argue that income distribution can affect investment directly, not only
through political instability, but also through two additional channels. The first one is a
"Kaldorian" saving function. According to Kaldor (1956), the "capitalists" save more in
proportion to their income than the "workers". Testing this hypothesis would require data
on the functional distribution on income, which is not available for most countries in our
sample. However, since income from capital is typically concentrated in the top quintile
of the population, there is a strong correlation between functional distribution of income
and the share of income of the top quintile or of the middle class. Thus, the "Kaldorian"
hypothesis could be expressed as a negative relationship between the share of the middle
class and the saving rate and therefore investment, after controlling for the effects of income
distribution on investment through its effects on socio-political instability. On the other
hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Bertola (1994) argue that the more unequal the
distribution of income, the higher is the demand for fiscal redistribution through taxation
of capital. The latter may depress investment by increasing the tax burden on investors.
In order to explore these direct channel we have run a second specification, in which we
added an income distribution variable in the investment equation. However, since the two
channels discussed above go in opposite direction, the sign of the associated coefficient is a
priori ambiguous.
Finally, note that the dependent variable in equation (2) is total investment (INV).
We use total rather than private investment because the breakdown of investment between
private and public is available only for 56 of the 71 countries of our sample and only from
1970 onward. Aside from considerations of data availability, there are reasons to believe
that public investment as well as private investment should be negatively affected in periods
of high socio- political instability. Since these are usually periods of high and contrasting
reasons that are not clear to us, in all his regressions Gupta uses the 1970 value of the SPI index rather
than its average on the estimation period as we do. These and other differences are sufficient to explain
the difference in results between the two works: in fact, contrary to our results, in Gupta's book both
income distribution and political instability turn out to be insignificant in explaining political instability
and investment respectively.
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demands on the government budget, public investment projects are likely to be reduced to
make room for redistributive expenditure.
5 Estimation of the basic specification.
We start by estimating the basic specification of equations (2) and (3) in columns (la)
and (lb) of Table 5. The two key coefficients are those that capture the effects of SPI
on INV and of MIDCLASS on SPI. Both coefficients have the expected signs and are
significant at the 5% level: socio-political instability depresses investment and a rich middle
class reduces socio-political instability. A "healthy" middle class is conducive to capital
accumulation because it creates conditions of social stability. As noted above, the share
of income of the middle class has a correlation of almost -1 with the share of the richest
quintile; thus, a wealthier middle class implies more equality in the distribution of income.
An increase by one standard deviation of the share of the middle class is associated with
a decrease in the index of political instability by about 5.7, which corresponds to about
48% of its standard deviation. This in turn is associated with an increase in the share
of investment in GDP of about 2.85 percentage points. The effect of income distribution
on investment implied by these estimates is definitely not negligible, since the difference
between the highest and lowest value of MIDCLASS in the sample is about 4 standard
deviations. In addition, an exogenous increase in the SPI index by one standard deviation
causes a decrease in the share of investment in GDP of about 5.97 percentage points.
The coefficient on PPPI in the investment equation has the expected negative sign
and is significant at high levels of confidence: market distortions do have negative effects
on investment. The second proxy for market distortions, PPPIDE, is insignificant. Con-
sistently with the results of the existing literature, initial GDP per capita has a positive,
although insignificant, coefficient.12
The estimation results for the SPI equation are also very sensible. PRIM has a
negative and significant coefficient: as expected, countries with higher levels of education
tend to be more stable.
In columns (2a) and (2b) we add three regional dummies, ASIA (for the East Asian
countries), LA AM (for Latina American countries) and AFRICA (for Sub-Saharan coun-
tries), in the SPI equation. There are at least two reasons for this: first, cultural and/or
12Note that our results in the investment equation are consistent with the reduced form results in Barro
(1991).
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historical reasons may influence the amount of socio-political unrest in different regions of
the world. Second, in certain regions., particularly Africa, under-reporting of socio-political
events can be particularly acute. Of the three regional dummies, only LA AM is significant:
as expected, on average Latin American countries tend to be much more unstable than the
other countries in the sample. The coefficient of SPI in the investment equation is very
similar to that of column (la), while the coefficient of MIDCLASS in the SPI equation
drops (in absolute value) by about 30% to -.68, although it remains strongly significant.
This is hardly surprising, since the Latin America countries in the sample are more unstable
than the average and, especially, have a particularly unequal distribution of income. Since
regional dummies do appear to be important in our regressions, from now on we include
them in all our reported estimates; it might be worthwhile noting that, if we did not include
them, in general our results on the income distribution variable would be stronger than the
ones we report.13
6 Robustness and sensitivity analysis.
We first tested the sensitivity of our results to the particular SPI index used. In a previ-
ous version of this paper we used an index proposed by Gupta (1990): this index (SPIG)
was obtained by applying the method of discriminant analysis to a larger sample than
ours (about 100 countries). In addition to the variables used in our index14 , Gupta in-
cludes: PROTEST, the number of political demonstrations against a government; RIOT,
the number of riots; STRIKE, the number of political strikes; ATTACK, the number
of politically motivated attacks; EXECUTION, the number of politically motivated ex-
ecutions. Thus, our index differs from Gupta's for three reasons: his sample of countries
is different, he uses discriminant analysis rather than the principal component method to
construct it, and he includes many more variables. Despite these differences, the correlation
13As mentioned above, the breakdown of total investment into private and public investment is available
only for 56 countries and only from 1970 onward. We estimated the same specifications of Table 5 using
the average rate of private investment in the 1970-85 period with the following results: the effect of SPI on
investment remains large and statistically significant; the coefficient of MIDCLASS in the SPI equation
has the correct sign but is not significant at conventional-levels. We repeated the same regressions using
total investment over the same sample 1970-85: the results were essentially identical to those obtained when
using private investment. These findings (available upon request) suggest that the difference between the
results of Table 5 and those obtained with private investment are due to the sample size but especially
to the shorter time period. A fifteen year period (1970-85) may be too short for the type of structural,
long-run relationship between inequality and instability that we are testing. Therefore, we feel that it is
more reasonable to place more weight on the results obtained for the 1960-85 period.
14Note however that Gupta's measure of the variable DEM is slightly different from ours, although the
two measures are highly correlated.
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of Gupta's index to ours is extremely high, about .83 (see Table 4). Table 6 reports the
results obtained when using Gupta's SPIG index in the same systems estimated in Table
5.
Both the coefficient of the SPIG index in the investment equation and of MIDCLASS
in the SPIG equation have the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels.
Interestingly, the size of the coefficients in columns (la) and (lb) of Table 6 are such that
an increase in MIDCLASS by one standard deviation has similar effects on SPIG and,
through the latter, on investment as in the corresponding regressions of columns (la) and
(lb) of Table 5, where our SPI index is used. All the other coefficients too exhibit patterns
very similar to those of Table 5.
We have experimented by applying the principal component method to several combi-
nations of the long list of variables included in the Gupta's index. The pattern of results
that we obtain (available upon request) can be summarized as follows. First, when we
add RIOT, PROTEST, ATTACK or EXECUTION to the list of variables of our SPI
index, the results remain largely unaffected, and in some cases are even stronger than those
we have presented. The results are also largely independent of whether we use per capita or
total values for the variables that can be interpreted both ways, like the number of assassi-
nations, deaths, attacks, executions etc. Our results worsen slightly, compared to those of
Table 5, with indices that do not include successful and unsuccessful coups. This finding
suggests that these two variables are important to capture threats to property rights and
policy uncertainty. Finally, if we leave out the variable DEM, our results generally worsen.
Table 7 displays several additional specifications that build upon the basic one. In
this table we use our SPI index, but the results (available upon request) are very similar
when the SPIG index is used. Also, because we include the regional dummies in the SPI
equation, the estimates that appear in these two tables should be compared to columns
(2a) and (2b) of Table 5.
First, as discussed in section 4, there might be good reasons to include PRIM in the
investment equation, on the ground that physical and human capital might be complemen-
tary. Also, it might be important to control for GDP in the SPI equation, to test the
notion that "good things tend to go together", so that richer countries are more stable.
Columns (la) and (lb) of Table 7 control for PRIM in the investment equation and for
GDP in the SPI equation, respectively. The coefficients of both variables have the ex-
pected signs, although only PRIM in the investment equation is significant. Importantly,
the coefficients of SPI in the investment equation and of MIDCLASS in the SPI equation
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remain significant and largely unaffected relative to columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 5. The
coefficient of SPI falls in absolute value, from -.57 to -.40: this too is not surprising, since
primary school enrollment has a large negative correlation with socio-political instability.
In columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 7 we add the variable HOMOG in the SPI equation.
This variable is defined as the fraction of the population (in 1960) belonging to the main
ethnic and linguistic group. Thus, a lower value of this variable implies more ethnic frag-
mentation, which is likely to be a cause of political instability and mass violence (Hibbs
(1973)). The coefficient on this variable has the expected sign but is not significant at
conventional levels. Generally, depending on the other variables included in the regression,
HOMOG ha,s a coefficient which is always negative (as expected) but with varying degrees
of statistical significance. The estimates of the remaining coefficients are very similar to
those of columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 5.
Columns (3a) and (3b) of Table 7 display the estimate of the system with an income
distribution variable appearing directly in the investment equation. The rationale for this
specification follows directly from the arguments briefly surveyed in section 4. The coeffi-
cient on MIDCLASS in the investment equation is negative, suggesting that a "Kaldorian"
link between income distribution and investment is at work: economies with less concen-
trated distributions of income save and invest less. However, note that the coefficient is
statistically insignificant; moreover, as we discussed in section 4 the proper way to test the
Kaldorian hypothesis would be to use measures of the functional distribution of income,
which unfortunately is not available for most of the countries of our sample. We also es-
timated the same system, with the share of the bottom two quintiles of the population or
the share of the top quintile as the income distribution variable instead of MIDCLASS
in the investment equation. In both cases, the coefficient of the income distribution vari-
able is close to 0, and insignificant. These results have two possible interpretations. The
first one is that the only effect of income inequality on capital accumulation goes through
political instability. The second one is that, once political instability is controlled for, the
"Kaldorian" effect and the fiscal redistribution effect offset each other.
We also added several other exogenous variables that, on a priori grounds, are po-
tentially important determinants of investment and socio-political instability. In general,
none of these variables changed our results concerning the effects of income distribution
on socio-political instability and of the latter on investment. Two of these variables ap-
pear particularly interesting: urbanization and government consumption. As argued by
Huntington (1968) and Berg and Sachs (1988), urbanization leads to more social demands
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and political pressure for redistributive policies. Indeed, when we include a measure of
urbanization in 1960 among the regressors of the SPI equation, its coefficient is positive,
but insignificant. To the extent that government consumption is a proxy for the size of
government and government-induced distortions, one can argue that it should have a neg-
ative effect on investment. On the other hand, government consumption might belong in
the SPI equation, as higher expenditure by the government might be used to prevent or
defuse social unrest. We tried both specifications: indeed, government consumption has
a negative coefficient in both the investment and the SPI equation, although only in the
latter it is close to being significant. Importantly, both when urbanization and government
consumption are controlled for, the coefficients of SPI in the investment equation and of
MI DC LASS in the SPI equation are virtually unaffected.
We tried several additional permutations in the specification, using the two indices
of political instability and various combinations of the variables discussed so far. Our
results (available upon request) confirm the robustness of our findings both on the effects
of inequality on political instability and on the effects of the latter on investment.
We did find, however, an interesting exception, which we show in columns (4a) and (4b)
of Table 7: our results worsen significantly when we use the enrollment ratio in secondary
school (SEC), rather than in primary school, to control for human capital. In particular,
the coefficient of SPI in the investment equation falls only slightly in absolute value,
and remains strongly significant; but the coefficient of MI DC LASS in the investment
equation falls substantially, to -.38, and becomes insignificant. These results are due to the
high degree of correlation between SEC and MIDCLASS, which is about .6, i.e. roughly
double that between PRIM and MIDCLASS (see Table 4). Because of this pattern of
correlations, it becomes hard to disentangle the effects of income distribution on secondary
school enrollment and on SPI separately, while the problem is less acute when we use
instead primary school enrollment.
The high correlation between secondary school enrollment and MIDCLASS suggests
an additional channel through which income equality may enhance growth and accumula-
tion: in the presence of liquidity constraints due to capital market imperfections, a wealthy
middle class can afford to invest in higher education, while an impoverished one cannot. A
more extensive empirical analysis of the relationship between inequality and investment in
education is left for further research.15
An additional way of looking at the robustness of the results is to estimate the model
15See Perotti (1993) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1991) for theoretical discussions of this issue.
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using robust estimation methods. Roughly speaking, robust regression methods provide
estimators that downweigh those observations that are "outliers". One dimension along
which the robust estimators differ is the definition of an "outlier". Typically, an outlier is
characterized by a large residual. We have chosen to estimate the SPI and INV equations
by applying the bounded-influence estimator proposed by Krasker and Welsch (1982). The
main reason for this choice is that this estimator identifies and downweighs outliers not only
in the residuals' space, but also in the regressors' space. As shown by Krasker and Welsch
(1983), an observation can be very influential and nevertheless the residual corresponding
to that observation may be smaller than most other residuals. Since we are estimating a
simultaneous-equation model, we implement the 2SLS version of the Krasker and Welsch
estimator.16
Table 8 shows the Krasker and Welsch estimates of one of the basic specifications
of the SPI and INV equations, both with our index of socio-political instability and
with Gupta's. Thus, columns (la) and (lb) of Table 8 present the 2SLS Krasker-Welsch
estimates of columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 5, while columns (2a) and (2b) present the
2SLS Krasker-Welsch estimates of the columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 6. One can see
immediately that the point estimates of virtually all the coefficients are very similar, and
in many cases almost identical, to those of the 2SLS estimators. The main exception is the
coefficient of MIDCLASS in column (lb), which is -.49, against -.68 in column (2b) of
Table 5. Given the well known problems with measuring income distribution from surveys,
it is not entirely surprising that the coefficient of MIDCLASS should be less robust than
the others coefficients in our regressions; however, this coefficient remains significant even
in the robust regression.
The relative efficiency of the Krasker-Welsch estimator is always below .95, which is
often the value used in applied work. This is an indication that the estimates are indeed
robust: the less efficient is the Krasker-Welsch estimator relative to the 2SLS estimator,
the easier it is for an observation to be considered an outlier. 17 These results are
quite reassuring: although there are well known measurement error problems in income
distribution and political data, they are not of such a nature as to make the estimates of
16Robust estimator for 3SLS have not been devised yet. See Krasker and Welsch (1982) and Krasker,Kuh
and Welsch (1983) for a theoretical treatment of robust estimators, and Kuh and Welsch (1980) and Peters,
Samarov and Welsch (1982) for some applications. The estimates of this section are obtained by applying
a RATS program implemented in Perotti (1994).
17The reason why relative efficiencies are different in different equations is that we fixed the constant c
in Peters, Samarov and Welsch (1982) at a value of .55 rather than adjusting it every time to achieve a
desired value of relative efficiency.
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the model very sensitive to some particular observation.
Finally, we addressed the related issues of heteroskedasticity and misspecification due
to measurement errors. We therefore conducted several tests of misspecification and het-
eroskedasticity on the same systems that appear in Table 5. A first rough indicator of the
presence of misspecification possibly due to errors-in-variables problems is provided by a
Hausman test using 2SLS and 3SLS estimates. The statistic was never significant at the
10% level. As to heteroskedasticity, we ran a Breusch-Pagan test on the SPI equation,
assuming that the error variance was proportional to the inverse of initial GDP.18 Again,
the test was never significant. As an additional check, we reestimated the SPI equa-
tion applying White's heteroskedasticity correction, which in this IV framework becomes
White's Two-Stage-Instrumental-Variables estimator (see White (1983)). Again, neither
the coefficient estimates nor the t-statistics changed substantially.
7 Conclusions.
Income inequality increases socio-political instability which in turn decreases investment.
After an extensive battery of robustness tests, we can conclude that these results in our
sample of 71 countries are quite solid.
These results have positive and normative implications. From a positive point of view
they suggest an argument that might help explain different investment and growth perfor-
mances in different parts of the world. Several countries in South East Asia have had very
high growth rates in the post-WWII period. In the aftermath of the war, these countries
had land reforms that reduced income and wealth inequality. Furthermore, and, perhaps as
a result of this reform, these countries have been relatively stable politically, compared to,
say, Latin American countries. The latter, in turn, have had a much more unequal income
distribution, more socio-political instability and less growth. A particularly good example
of successful Asian countries are the "four dragons" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan). Unfortunately, because of data availability, these countries are not included
in our regressions. However, they would seem to fit our hypothesis, since these countries
have had much more stability and much less inequality than, say, Latin American countries,
which had a comparable GDP per capita in 1960.
From a normative point of view, our results have some implications for the effects of
18If errors in measuring income distribution are more severe in poorer countries, for instance because
the surveys are conducted with smaller budgets, the induced error variance will be inversely proportional
to GDP.
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redistributive policies. Fiscal redistribution, by increasing the tax burden on capitalists and
investors, reduces the propensity to invest. However, the same policies may reduce social
tensions and, as a result, create a socio-political climate more conducive to productive
activities and capital accumulation. 19 Thus, by this channel fiscal redistribution might
actually spur economic growth. Therefore the net effect of redistributive policies on growth
has to weigh the costs of distortionary taxation against the benefits of reduced social
tensions.
This paper, not unlike the related literature surveyed in the introduction, focuses on
policy outcomes (investment, growth etc.) and relates them to socio-economic variables.
The next step in this line of research is to look more explicitly at actual policy instruments,
as Perotti (1994) has started doing. The link between politics and economic outcomes goes
through policy choices, particularly, in this context, fiscal policy. Several questions are left
open: what are the effects of income inequality on the degree of redistribution implemented
in different political systems? Who actually benefits from such redistributions? What
are the distributional effects of different spending programs? Do the very poor really
benefit from government programs toward them? Answering these questions requires more
disaggregated fiscal policy data than those used so far.
19A similar argument has been put forward by Sala y Martin (1992). A related argument, suggested
by Fay (1993), focuses on illegal activities. Higher inequality fuels crime against private property; thus
redistributive policies protect property rights by reducing crime.
19
Table 1: Definition of variables and data sources.
This Table describes the data used in the regressions. All the data are from the Barro-Wolf
[1990] data set, except for the income distribution data which are mainly from Jain (1975)
(see Perotti (1994) for a more detailed list of the original sources) or unless otherwise in-
dicated.
GDP: GDP in 1960 in hundreds of 1980 dollars;
PRIM: primary school enrollment rate in 1960, from Barro and Lee (1993);
SEC: secondary school enrollment rate in 1960, from Barro and Lee (1993);
MI DC LASS: share of the third and fourth quintiles of the population in or around 1960;
INV: ratio of real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GDP (average from
1960 to 1985);
PPPI: PPP value of the investment deflator (U.S. = 1.0), 1960;
PPP IDE: Magnitude of the deviation of the PPP value for the investment deflator from
the sample mean, 1960;
SPI: index of socio-political instability, constructed using averages over 1960-85 of the
variables that appear in the formula of equation (1);
SPIG: index of socio-political instability, constructed using annual data from the formula
in Gupta (1990), average over 1960-85;
HOMOG: percentage of the population belonging to the main ethnic or linguistic group,
1960, from Canning and Fay (1993);
URB: Urban population as percentage of total in 1960. Source: World Bank Tables;
GOV: Government consumption as share of GDP, average 1970-85;
DEATH: average number of deaths in domestic disturbances, per millions population,
1960-85, from Jodice and Taylor (1988);
ASS ASS: average number of assassinations, 1960-85, from Jodice and Taylor (1988);
UCOUP: average number of unsuccessful coups, 1960-85, from Jodice and Taylor (1988);
SCOUP: average number of successful coups, 1960-85, from Jodice and Taylor (1988);
DEM: Dummy variable taking the value 1 for democracies, .5 for semi-democracies, and
0 for dictatorships, average 1960-85, from Jodice and Taylor (1988).
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Table 2: SPI index (sample 1960-85).
















































































































































Table 3: Summary statistics (sample 1960-85).



























































































For definitions of variables and sources, see Table 1. Values for ASSASS,
DEATH, SCOUP, UCOUP and DEM are before standardization.
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Table 4: Correlation matrix (sample 1960-85).





























































































































































































For definitions of variables and sources, see Table 1.
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Table 5: Investment and SPI equations, 1960-85.




































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very
similar.
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Table 6: Investment and SPIG equations, 1960-85.




































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very
similar.
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Table 7: Investment and SPI equations, alternative specifications, 1960-85.















































































































































11.13s.e.e. 6.02 11.01 6.85 10.74 8.98
2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very similar.
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Table 8: Investment and SPI equations, robust estimation, 1960-85.
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